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INTRODUCTION

The Congress has enacted a major overhaul of the federal
onshore oil and gas leasing program. This legislation was inspired
by glaring examples of receipt of less than fair market value for
federal oil and gas, serious problems of fraud and abuse in the
noncompetitive portion of the system, frustration by many in
industry over the unreliability and uncertainty in the existing
program, and a projected increase in revenues through program
reform. The new law, included in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987,1 is known as the "Federal Onshore Oil and
I Pub.

L. No. 100-203 (1987).
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1987

Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987" (Reform Act). It has broadreaching implications for the use of federal lands and the disposition of federal resources.
The Reform Act eliminates the "known geological structure"
(KGS) designation, previously used as a means of determining
which lands are to be leased competitively. 2 Instead, the legislation
establishes a two-tiered leasing system for federal onshore oil and
gas lands.' Under the new law, all lands available for leasing are
initially to be made available on a competitive bid basis.4 Lands
for which no bid is received or for which the highest bid is less
than the national minimum acceptable bid are available for leasing
on a noncompetitive basis for a period of two years.' At the end
again be availof this period of two years, unleased lands would
6
able for leasing only through competitive sale.
The new law retains some aspects of the old system, while
favoring a more market-oriented, competitive approach to leasing
of federal lands.7 The Reform Act in all likelihood signals the
end of the present-day simultaneous oil and gas leasing system,
also known as the "lottery," which has been fraught with abuse
and has given rise to fraudulent activities.' In addition, the new
legislation is intended to provide certainty and efficiency in the
leasing of federal oil and gas.

I.
A.

BACKGROUND FOR THE LEGISLATION

Oil and Gas Leasing on Federal Lands

The federal government owns 732 million acres, one-third of
the nation's onshore land. 9 The Bureau of Land Management
2 The Reform Act, § 5102, to be codified at 30 U.S.C. § 226(b) (30 U.S.C.A. app.
§ 226(b) (1988)). The new law also eliminates the "favorable petroleum geological province"
designation, previously applicable to certain lands leased under the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act. Id. at § 5105.
The Reform Act, § 5102, to be codified at 30 U.S.C. § 226(b), (c).
The Reform Act, § 5102(a), to be codified at 30 U.S.C. § 226(b).
The Reform Act, § 5102(b), to be codified at 30 U.S.C. § 226(c).
6 Id.
See, e.g., 133 CONG. REc. 327-328 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987) (remarks of Sen.
Bumpers); 133 CONG. REC. 8323-8324 (daily ed. June 18, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Melcher).
s Id.

9

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, KNOWN GEOLOGIC STRUCTURES UNDER THE MIN-

ERAL LEASING ACT: INTERPRETING AND APPLYING THE TERM "KNOWN GEOLOGIC STRUCTURE

OF A PRODUCING OIL AND GAS FIELD" 5 (1986).
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(BLM) administers oil and gas leasing programs for approximately
660 million acres for which the federal government owns the
mineral rights.' 0 Of this, 335 million acres are available for mineral leasing in the lower forty-eight states."
At the end of fiscal year 1987, approximately 68.5 million
acres, (excluding Alaska) were under federal onshore oil and gas
lease.m2 This represents over twenty percent of federal lands legally
available for leasing in the lower forty-eight states."
Historically, over ninety-five percent of all outstanding leases
have been awarded noncompetitively. 4 Most onshore oil and gas
discoveries have been made on leases issued noncompetitively. 5
At the end of fiscal year 1987, there were 80,113 outstanding
federal oil and gas leases, excluding those in Alaska. 16 Of this
total, approximately nine percent, or 7587 leases covering 1.7
million acres, were issued competitively. The remaining ninetyone percent, or 72,526 leases covering 66.8 million acres, were
7
issued noncompetitively.
Of the leases issued noncompetitively, most were issued under
the simultaneous oil and gas leasing (SIMO) system. 8 At the end
of fiscal year 1987, seventy-one percent of the outstanding leases
issued noncompetitively, or 51,530 leases covering 42.4 million
acres, excluding those in Alaska, had been issued under the SIMO
system. 19
B. Authority for Oil and Gas Leasing on Federal Lands
The Mineral Leasing Act (MLA) authorizes the Secretary of
the Interior to lease deposits of oil and gas on much federal
land.20 Prior to its amendment during the 100th Congress, the
10Id.
IIId.
12BUREAU
STATISTICS
13

OF LAND

MANAGEMENT,

U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND

58-63 (1988).

Id.

1 S. REP. No. 188, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987).
Is Id.
16 BUREAU

OF LAND

MANAGEMENT,

U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

LANDw
STATISTICS 58-63 (1988).
17 Id.
Is Id.
19 Id.

"' Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. (1986).

PUBLIC
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MLA allowed the leasing only of federal oil and gas on lands in
a "known geologic structure of a producing oil and gas field."'"
On all other federal lands available for oil and gas leasing, leases
could be acquired on a noncompetitive basis by the "person first
making application for the lease who is qualified to hold a lease"
under the MLA. 2
Under the program prior to amendment, there were two types
of non-competitive leasing established by regulation: (1)over-thecounter, and (2) SIMO.2 Lands not within a KGS that had been
leased previously were re-leased under the SIMO system, in which
a lessee was randomly selected from a number of applicants
participating in a lottery- 4 Lands not within a KGS never before
leased and lands not receiving applications in the SIMO system
were leased by application on a first-come, first-served basis,
known as over-the-counter (OTC). 5
The SIMO system started in the late 1950s when the BLM
was frequently overwhelmed with many applicants seeking to lease
the same tract. The system was used as a method to determine
the first qualified applicant.
The MLA thus gave the Secretary of the Interior broad discretionary power to issue oil and gas leases on public lands not
within any known geologic structure of a producing oil and gas
field. 26 The policy of the MLA was to provide incentives to explore
new, unproven oil and gas areas through noncompetitive leasing,
while assuring adequate compensation to the federal government
for leasing activity in producing areas through competitive bid27
ding .
When Congress initially enacted the MLA, it grappled with
the best means to achieve this balance and considered various

21 Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 226(bX1) (1986), amended by 30 U.S.C. § 226(bX1)

(Supp. 1988).
1 Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 226(c) (1986), amended by 30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1)
(Supp. 1988).
BLM Minerals Management, Noncompetitive Leases, 43 C.F.R. Part 3110 (1987).
2,BLM Minerals Management, Simultaneous Filing, First Qualified Applicant, 43
C.F.R. Subpart 3112.4 (1987).

2 BLM Minerals Management, Over-the-Counter Offers Requirements, 43 C.F.R.
Subpart 3111.1 (1987).
2 Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965).
2 Arkla Exploration Co. v. Texas Oil and Gas Corp., 734 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1984).
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methods for drawing the line between competitive and noncompetitive leasing. Congress considered and rejected the use of mileage restrictions for determining where competitive leasing should
take place. For example, the Congress considered the use of a
twenty-mile limit from a producing well as the standard for
competitive leasing. 2
One Senator who strongly opposed the use of mileage restrictions was Senator John Kendrick (D. Wyoming), who objected
on the grounds that production in Wyoming usually occurred in
"clearly defined" domes or anticlines. 29 When the MLA was
debated in 1918, Senator Kendrick offered an amendment, which
was subsequently adopted, to draw the distinction between competitive and noncompetitive leasing on the basis of whether lands
were "situated within the geological structure of a producing oil
or gas field." 30 Industry spokespersons as well argued in favor of
the KGS standard, and against an arbitrary mileage limitation.
They indicated that competitive leasing within a KGS would better
reflect the way in which oil accumulates underground since the
KGS was intended to reflect the geology of the area rather than
merely a mileage limit.
Congress adopted the KGS standard and left to the Secretary
of the Interior the task of implementing a leasing program under
the Act." Over the years, implementing and defining the KGS
concept has proved problematic to the Department of the Interior
(DOI), and has resulted in litigation, as well as in efforts at
legislative reform, as discussed below.
C. Administrative Definition and Implementation of the KGS
Concept
Since 1959, DOI has defined the KGS as follows: " 'Known
geological structure' '(KGS)' means technically the trap in which
an accumulation of oil and gas has been discovered by ttrilling

56TH CONG. REC. 657 (1918).

An "anticline" is a geological structure consisting of a fold in the earth with sides
sloping down from a common crest. Arkla Exploration Co. v. Texas Oil and Gas Corp.,
734 F.2d 347, 351 n.7 (8th Cir. 1984).
56 CONG. REc. 657 (1918).

Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 226(a) (1986).
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and determined to be productive, the limits of which include all
acreage that is presumptively productive." 32
In applying this definition and administering the leasing program under the applicable authorities, the DOI has considered
varying factors: (1) maximizing revenues while maximizing exploration and development; (2) reducing speculation while making
the nation's resources accessible and available to the public; and
(3) encouraging greater competition while protecting the interests
of smaller independent producers. 3a In attempting to meet these
objectives, the DOI encountered several problems and has been
subject to criticism in many instances.
II.

PROBLEMS WITH THE FEDERAL ONSHORE OIL AND GAS
LEASING PROGRAM

For many years, the federal onshore oil and gas leasing program was criticized for: (1) failing to obtain fair market value
when inaccurate or restrictive KGS designations were made; and
(2) allowing speculation and fraud by third parties . 4 The KGS
designation process resulted in receipt by the public of less than
fair market value in the Fort Chaffee and Amos Draw cases35
and caused substantial uncertainty in the leasing program. The
6
SIMO lottery led to allegations of speculation and fraud.
A.

The KGS

Problems in determining the extent of the KGS created significant difficulties for the federal onshore oil and gas leasing
program. Because the KGS was the standard for determining
whether lands would be leased competitively or noncompetitively,
faulty geological analysis and rigid administrative practices relating to KGS designations sometimes yielded results which were not

11E.

Finley, The Definition of Known Geological Structures of Producing Oil and

Gas Fields, in U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CmCULAR No. 419 at 1 (1959); BLM Minerals

Management, 43 C.F.R. § 3100.0-5(1) (1987).
11 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,

ISSUES SURROUNDING CONTINUATION OF THE

NONCOMPETIVE OI AND GAS LOTTERY SYSTEM 5 (GAO/RCED-85-88, 1985).
S. REp. No. 188, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987).
I
Id.
at 2-3.
" Id.
at 3.
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in the public interest.17 The imprecision involved in the KGS
determination resulted in some instances in a failure to lease
competitively lands which were later found to contain valuable
mineral deposits and for which a high level of competitive interest
3
existed.
Historically, the KGS concept was narrowly construed. 9 Under the old system, the DOI identified a KGS based on geological
data and the location of producing wells. Because of continuing
deficiencies in making geological determinations with respect to
the KGS, leases which should have been issued competitively to
the highest bidder were instead issued noncompetitively for the
minimal filing fee. ° Available geological data were often not
analyzed in setting the KGS boundaries, and the DOI was not
always aware of all wells that had been drilled in surrounding
areas.

41

Two notorious examples of the problems with KGS designations which resulted in failure to obtain fair market value for the
leased minerals occurred at Fort Chaffee and Amos Draw.
1. Fort Chaffee
In 1979, the DOI awarded noncompetitive leases for $1 per
acre on 33,000 acres within the Fort Chaffee military reservation
in Arkansas. 42 The lands involved were not designated as being
within a KGS, although surrounding areas were highly productive.
The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources received
testimony that some of the Fort Chaffee lands would have brought
$500 per acre had they been leased competitively. 43 In 1980, 24,000
acres of land adjoining the Fort Chaffee leases were leased competitively for approximately $1,705 per acre." Instead of the U.S.
Treasury receiving $24,000, (the noncompetitive rate), the federal

See generally id. at 2.
m See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
" S. REP. No. 412, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986).
, H.R. REP. No. 378, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1987).
3

4' U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IssuEs SuRRoUNDING CONTINUATION OF THE
NONCOMPETITIVE O. AND GAS LOTrERY SYSTEM 3 (GAO/RCED-85-88, 1985).
42 S. Ra'. No. 188, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987).

S. REP. No. 793, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1980).
51
" S. REP. No. 188, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987).
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government received $43 million, with $21.5 million of this amount
4
paid to the state.

The Fort Chaffee case was an extreme example of the KGS
gone awry. The case involved what is known as "pent up" lands,
or lands which had been withheld from oil and gas leasing.
Because of their status as acquired military land, the Fort Chaffee
lands had not, prior to 1976, been available for leasing.4 As soon
as Congress passed legislation authorizing the Secretary of the
Interior to issue mineral leases for acquired lands within military
reservations, over 800 lease applications were filed for lands in
military reservations throughout the United States. 47 Thus, shortly
after the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976 made
the Fort Chaffee lands available for oil and gas leasing, applications for twenty leases covering approximately 33,000 acres were
48
submitted to the DOI.

Because of the administrative procedure used by the DOI,
Fort Chaffee lands were not included as part of a KGS. Prior to
leasing, lands had to be "clearlisted," or certified as not within
a KGS.4 9 In designating the KGS, a map was maintained in the
local BLM office which contained well numbers and the production depth for producing wells. In using a "step-out process,"
BLM officials considered only sections adjacent to producing wells
11Id. Pursuant to the MLA, a state (other than Alaska) is entitled to fifty percent
of monies received from sales, bonuses, royalties, and rentals due to the leasing of federal
lands under the MLA within the state's borders. 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1986).
46Congress had generally extended the provisions of the MLA to "include all lands
heretofore or hereafter acquired by the United States to which the 'mineral leasing laws'
have not be extended ..
" when in 1947 it enacted the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired
Lands, 30 U.S.C. § 351 (1986). However, Congress explicitly excluded acquired lands "set
apart for military or naval purposes," 30 U.S.C. § 352 (1986), such as including the Fort
Chaffee lands. The Congress eliminated this military and naval exemption effective August
4, 1976. Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-377, Sec. 12, 90
Stat. 852 (1976).
47 Oil and Gas Leasing of Lands Belonging to Fort Chaffee, Arkansas: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Energy Resources andMaterialsProductionof the Senate Comm.
on Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1979) (statement of Donald
P. Truesdell, Acting Assistant Director for Energy and Mineral Resources, Bureau of Land
Mangement).
" Arkla Exploration Co. v. Watt, 562 F. Supp. 1214, 1216 (W.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd
sub nom. Arkla Exploration Co. v. Texas Oil and Gas Corp., 734 F.2d 347 (8th Cir.
1984).
'9 Arkla Exploration Co. v. Texas Oil and Gas Corp., 734 F.2d 347, 352 (8th Cir.
1984).
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for expanding the KGS, based on the state well spacing unit.5 0 As
a result, the BLM did not consider any lands in the interior of
Fort Chaffee for possible inclusion in a KGS. 51 In the Fort
Chaffee case, and under the then-prevailing administrative interpretation, a KGS was expanded only if the BLM official thought
that the area would produce from the same specific trap, pool or
reservoir from which production was occurring in the adjacent
52
section.
Litigation ensued, and the Federal District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas found that the BLM had failed to
use relevant and important geological information in the clearlisting process. 3 The court ruled that the clearlisting procedure
54
was arbitrary and the leases were invalidated.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
District Court decision55 and found not only that relevant geological information had been inadequately considered by the BLM,
but that competitive interest should also have been taken into
56
account.
2.

Amos Draw

Another example of the serious problems inherent in the KGS
designation process occurred in the Amos Draw area of northeast
Wyoming. In 1983, fourteen leases totaling 11,012 acres were
issued noncompetitively through the lottery. BLM's KGS "step-

"°Id. at 351.
51 Id.
52 Arkla Exploration Co. v. Watt, 562 F. Supp. 1214, 1222 (W.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd
sub nom. Arkla Exploration Co. v. Texas Oil and Gas Corp., 734 F.2d 347 (8th Cir.
1984).
" 562 F. Supp. at 1223.
,Id. at 1227.
734 F.2d at 349.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated:
In short, the Department did not do its homework before it classified the
Fort Chaffee lands as non-KGS under an arbitrary mileage rule and granted
these leases. These actions were taken without consideration of such "relevant
factors," [citation omitted] as available geologic data and actual competitive
interest. Based on our review of the administrative record as amplified and
explained by the proceedings in the district court, we hold that these Secretarial actions are unlawful.
734 F.2d at 361.
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out" process57 resulted in four separate KGS's which covered
3,760 acres in the vicinity involved. After the leases were issued,
BLM obtained geological data demonstrating a common reservoir
under all four KGS's. On November 23, 1983, BLM consolidated
these KGS's into one large KGS covering 28,755 acres. This large
KGS encompassed all fourteen leases." The government collected
only approximately $13,000 in rental fees and $1.2 million in
lottery applications. The lease winners reportedly resold the leases
for fees estimated between $50 and $100 million. 9 Of the fourteen
lease winners, only four would provide information to the DOI
on the amount received when they resold the leases. 60 The General
Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that a competitive sale would
have generated at least $13 million more on four of the fourteen
61
leases where resale values had been identified.
3.

Uncertainty in the Program

Problems with the KGS designation system resulted in uncertainty in the federal onshore oil and gas leasing program. As the
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs noted, "This
uncertainty threatens the stability of the program and calls into
question its ability to contribute to the energy needs of the Nation
as well as provide for a fair rate of return to the public from the

" The "step-out" process was the incremental extension of a KGS, often based on
the state's spacing unit for oil and gas wells.
11 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES SURROUNDING CONTINUATION OF THE
NONCOMPETITIVE OI AND GAS LOTTERY SYSTEM 12 (GAO/RCED-85-88, 1985).

S. REP. No. 188, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1987).
For these four leases, the amount obtained by the government in filing fee receipts
and the amounts subsequently received by the lease winners when the leases were assigned
are set forth below:
60

Lease No.

Filing Fee Receipts

Value Received
from Assignee

W-84919
W-84932
W-84936
W-84937
TOTAL

$ 34,425
$ 86,525
$102,000
$ 24,000
$347,250

$ 135,000
$ 7,700,000
$ 5,760,000
$ 138,000
$13,633,355

U.S.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES SURROUNDING CONTINUATION OF THE NONCOM-

PEITIVE OIL AND GAS LOTTERY SYSTEM
61

Id. at 4.

31 (GAO/RCED-85-88, 1985).
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development of federally owned resources.' '62 Because of problems with the KGS designation process, as well as other difficulties, the DOI was forced to suspend leasing under certain
circumstances. As one DOI official noted, "The intermittent shutdowns that have occurred within the program since 1979 have not
allowed for a predictable and stable program. "63
Problems with the KGS resulted in the DOI's extreme caution
with respect to KGS designations. The DOI had many thousands
of acres under study for inclusion in KGS's. It suspended leasing
on those acres pending completion of the review. This caused the
industry to complain about acreage being "blocked up" and
unavailable for leasing. 64
In addition, the KGS designation process gave rise to uncertainty and litigation when the status of certain lands changed
during the lease application process. For example, in McDade v.
Morton,65 land which had been available on a noncompetitive
basis was designated as within a KGS upon the receipt of additional geological information received after the lease offer had
been filed, but before its acceptance. 66 In McDade, the court ruled
the DOI was authorized to reject the offer. Similarly, in Bender
v. Clark,67 the plaintiff filed a noncompetitive oil and gas offer
for certain public lands in New Mexico.6 However, before the
lease was issued, the Department determined the land was within
an undefined KGS, and BLM rejected the plaintiff's offer. The
court upheld the Secretary's action in that case. 69

H.R. REP. No. 378, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1987).
Oversight Hearing on Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Program Before the
Subcomm. on Mining and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Interiorand Insular
Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1985) (statement of J. Steven Griles, Acting Assistant
Secretary, Land and Minerals Management).
" Hearing on S. 66 and S. 1388 Before the Subcomm. on Mineral Resources
Development and Production of the Comm. On Energy and Natural Resources, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1987) (statement of Kenneth A. Wonstolen, Executive Director and
General Counsel, Independent Petroleum Ass'n of Mountain States).
65 353 F. Supp. 1006 (D.D.C. 1973).
Id. at 1007-09.
67 744 F.2d 1424 (10th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1425.
0 Id. at 1430.
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The SIMO Lottery

The SIMO lottery has been widely criticized for encouraging
speculation and fraud. 0 Criticism has centered around the fact
that companies have misrepresented to the public the chance of
winning leases, the value of leases, and the likelihood of industry
interest in buying leases from members of the public should they
71
win in the lottery.
There were also questions as to the legality of the lottery
itself. Nowhere in the MLA was the lottery specifically authorized.
On April 7, 1980, the Department of Justice wrote a memorandum for the Solicitor of the DOI stating that while federal law
should not be construed to prohibit the lottery, "the issue is a
close one and . . . persuasive arguments can be made on either
side." 72 The memorandum also stated that the SIMO system may
"indirectly engender the type of activity at which anti-lottery laws
were aimed." '73 It went on to recommend that the Department of
74
the Interior seek specific authorization for the lottery program.
In addition to providing an opportunity for fraud, the lottery
also encouraged speculation .7 In a 1985 analysis, the Government
Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that "the system itself,
whether operating properly or not, inherently invites speculator
participation.1 76 The GAO further noted the following effects of
speculation:
1. Speculators are often viewed as an impediment to industry
and timely oil and gas development;

70 S. REP. No. 188, 100th Cong.,

1st Sess. 3 (1987).

71 Id.
72

S. REP. No. 793, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980).

73

Id.

7,

Id.

71 One

method of abusing the lottery system was flooding the lease drawing with
applications. Under this scheme, middlemen who had made contact with companies seeking
leases used lease application cards pre-signed by members of the public for submission in
the lottery. The same individuals who allowed their names to be used on the lease
application cards also executed assignment cards. Thus, leases won in the lottery were
assigned to the middlemen who in turn assigned the leases to the company making the
initial request. S. REP. No. 793, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980).
76 U.S. GENERAL AccoUNTINo OFFicE, IssuEs SuROtUNDINO CONTNATION OF THE
NONCOMPETMVE OL AND GAs LOTTERY SYSTEM 36 (GAO/RECD-85-88, 1985).
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2. Filing services may mislead people into spending their personal savings to speculate on generally worthless oil and gas
holdings; and
3. For a nominal investment, speculators often receive revenue
that should more properly be going to the federal and state
7
governments. 1
According to the GAO, during fiscal year 1983, over fifty percent
78
of lottery filings came from filing service initiatives.
Numerous criminal investigations, prosecutions, and convictions have resulted from fraud and abuse of the lottery. For
example, two fugitives who defrauded individual investors of over
$150,000 were arrested in Lakeland, Florida. These investors were
79
individuals who wanted to participate in the SIMO lottery.
Another instance of fraudulent activity under the federal onshore oil and gas leasing program was the "forty acre merchant
problem.", 0 Under this scheme, individuals obtained leases which
contained no known oil or gas resources, divided them into parcels
of forty acres, and sold them using false promises of a high
return." In 1976, the GAO recommended that lease assignments
of less than 640 acres be prohibited. A GAO investigation found
that a single 2,560-acre lease had been divided into forty-nine
separate leases and assigned to separate parties.12 This resulted in
forty-nine times the paper work for the DOI. In addition, development was virtually prohibited because the units were too small

Id. at 37.
Id. at 38. (Filing services are organizations which make lottery filings on behalf
of individual participants.).
"

7I

- OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, SEMI-

8 (October 1987).
The lottery system has also given rise to extensive civil litigation. For example, in

ANNUAL REPORT

-

Ballard E. Spencer Trust, Inc. v. Morton, 544 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1976), the court rejected
the plaintiff's offer for oil and gas leases where the offer failed to set forth the corporate
qualifications on an entry card as required by regulation. The offer also failed to set forth

the serial number. The Secretary took this action even though the corporate qualifications
were on file with the BLM. In Cranston v. Clark, 767 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1985), a
disappointed bidder brought suit challenging the lottery result. In that case, the application
for the noncompetitive lease was ruled not to be a multiple filing that violated Department
regulations.
91 H.R. REP. No. 378, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1987).
S. REP. No. 793, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. 3 (1980).
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to justify drilling, and a large number of lessees would have to
be contacted to acquire sufficient acreage. 3
III.

ADMINISTRATIVE INITIATIVES

The DOI, in response to the problems with the federal onshore
oil and gas leasing program, took several actions to reform the
system administratively. For instance, the DOI tightened procedures for establishing KGS's, improved procedures for screening
lands prior to leasing, and assigned additional employees to aid
in reevaluating existing KGS's.84
The program was actually suspended several times as a result
of administrative problems. For example, on February 29, 1980,
the Secretary of the Interior suspended onshore noncompetitive
oil and gas leasing due to allegations of widespread abuse.85 The
lottery was suspended again in October of 1983, due to problems
6
resulting from the KGS designation process.
In an effort to discourage speculation and fraud, in 1982, the
Department of the Interior increased the filing fee for participation in the lottery to seventy-five dollars. 7 In addition, in 1984,
the DOI imposed a requirement that the rental be paid in ad8

vance.

1

After the problems at Fort Chaffee and Amos Draw, the DOI
instituted new internal requirements with respect to KGS designations. The BLM issued Instruction Memorandum 84-35 on
October 14, 1983.89 This instruction stated that the administrative
step-out was not itself a "sufficient" procedure. 9° The instruction
required consideration of shows of gas or oil, acknowledged that
stratigraphic accumulations could be very extensive, and stated
that a closed anticline may be assumed to be presumptively pro-

83 Id.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES SURROUNDING

CONTINUATION OF TBE

NONCOMFETITVE OI AND GAS LOTTERY SYSTEM 5 (GAO/RCED-85-88, 1985).

S. REP. No. 793, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980).
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES SURROUNDING CONTINUATION OF THE
NONCOMPETITvE OIL AND GAS LOTTERY SYSTEM 7-8 (GAO/RCED-85-88, 1985).
"

Id. at 40.

"8 Id.

11BUREAU

OF LAND

MANAGEMENT,

MEMORANDUM 84-35 (October 14, 1983).
'
Id. at 1.

U.S.

DEP'T. OF THE INTERIOR, INSTRUCTION
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ductive. The instruction required that all existing KGS's be reevaluated.
The DOI also issued Instruction Memorandum 84-36 in October of 1983.91 This internal instruction emphasized the importance of clear listing, or making certain that the lands were not
within a KGS prior to issuance of a lease on a noncompetitive
basis.
Finally, the Department issued Instruction Memorandum 84439 (IM 84-439) in April of 1984.92 This instruction was designed
to deal with the problem of inconsistency and the need for better
documentation of KGS determinations. IM 84-439 required certain written documentation and review of KGS determinations by
designated technical reviewers.
However, despite these administrative initiatives, in 1985, the
GAO concluded that no actions "are likely to totally eliminate
the potential for future problems-primarily because of the degree
of impreciseness inherent in setting KGS boundaries and because,
in some states, if industry considers its well data proprietary, they
are not initially available to Interior from the state oil and gas
commissions." 93
In addition to several reviews by the GAO, additional analyses
were undertaken by consultants and entities outside the DOI. As
early as 1970, the Public Land Law Review Commission reported
competitive sale requirements especially for oil and gas were too
94
narrow and recommended that they be significantly increased.
The Committee on Known Geologic Structure of the National
Research Council conducted a study relating to the KGS and set
forth the following recomendations: 95
1. utilize more fully the discretionary powers of the Secretary;
2. revise the definition of KGS;

91

BUREAU

MEMORANDUM
91

BUREAU

MEMORANDUM

OF LAND

MANAGEMENT,

U.S.

DEP'T. OF THE INTERIOR,

INSTRUCTION

U.S.

DEP'T. OF THE INTERIOR,

INSTRUCTION

84-36 (October 14, 1983).
OF LAND

MANAGEMENT,

84-439 (April 1984).

- U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES SURROUNDING CONTINUATION OF
NONcOMPETITVE OIL AND GAS LO=rERY SYSTEM 5 (GAO/RCED-85-88, 1985).

1 S.

REP.

THE

No. 793, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980).

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, KNoWN GEOLOGIC STRUCTURES UNDER THE MINERAL LEASING ACT: INTEPRETING AND APPLYING THE TERM "KNOWN GEOLOGIC STRUCTURE
91

OF A PRODUCING OIL AND GAs FELD"

(1986).
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3. strengthen information requirements and standards;
4.

review KGS staffing requirements and staff development

opportunities; and
5. establish stronger KGS review procedures.

The Committee concluded the KGS concept could be successfully
implemented to achieve the purposes of the MLA. 96 The National
Research Council Committee went on to suggest a definition for
the KGS. 97 The DOI did not, however, adopt this suggested
definition.
A study by Keplinger Technology Consultants, Inc., retained
by BLM to review its program, concluded:
1. a significant backlog of KGS work existed in many BLM
offices;
2. inadequate staffing existed;
3. there was a shortage of senior personnel with appropriate
technical knowledge;
4. the KGS program tended to be subordinated to other

demand workload requirements; and
5. there was a lack of standardization of procedures, which

impaired quality control. 98
Similar problems were also noted by the GAO in its 1985
report. 99 There, the GAO stated that staffing problems, data

problems, and organizational and communication problems existed with respect to the KGS determination process. |'

°

In addi-

Id. at 2-4.

Id. The suggested definition was as follows:
The "Known Geologic Structure of a producing oil and gas field (KGS)" denotes an
area of land that overlies the actual or extrapolated extent of one or more traps, of
whatever nature, which contain productive accumulations of oil or gas that have been
confirmed by drilling and testing. The KGS may include multiple, distinct pools or
accumulations the extent of which is controlled by geological structure of stratigraphy as
determined by the application of professional expertise and scientifically sound evaluation
of the available relevant data. The boundaries of the KGS must coincide with all legal
subdivisions and wel-spacing units. Id. at 3.
" KEPLINGER TECHNOLOGY CONSULTANTS, INC, REPORT To THE DIRECTOR, EVALUATION OF TIE KGS DRAINAGE PROGRAM, (September 1, 1985).
9 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES SURROUNDING CONTINUATION OF TIE
NONCOMPETITIVE OIL AND GAS LOTTERY SYSTEM 19-20 (GAO/RCED-85-88, 1985).
-00 Id.
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tion, the GAO concluded KGS procedures were a "significant
administrative burden" on the DOI. 10
Thus, despite efforts to deal with the KGS and lottery problems administratively, the federal onshore oil and gas leasing
programs continued to be plagued by difficulties.
IV.

A.

LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVEs

The Ninety-second Through Ninety-eighth Congresses

Problems in the federal onshore oil and gas leasing program
inspired several legislative initiatives. As early as 1971, S. 2726
was offered by the DOI and introduced by Senator Henry Jackson
(D. Washington), then Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs.'°2 The bill would have required competitive leasing in all but a few situations.
In 1973, S. 1040 was drafted by the DOI, and Senator Jackson
again introduced the bill at the request of the Administration. 13
The legislation would have amended the MLA to provide for
competitive leasing of all federal minerals. In that same year,
President Nixon proposed a sweeping reform of the Mining Law
of 1872 and the MLA. The President called for an all-competitive
oil and gas leasing system. 104
During the Ninety-sixth Congress, Senator Jackson introduced
S. 902.105 The bill directed the Secretary of the Interior to establish
and implement an oil and gas leasing program for onshore federal
lands. Under that legislation, the Secretary was to identify those
areas which were favorable for the discovery of oil or gas. The
bill stated that favorable areas were to be leased only by competitive bidding.
Also in 1979, during the Ninety-sixth Congress, Senator Jack1°
son introduced S. 1637 at the request of the Administration. 6
The bill provided that competitive leasing was to occur on those
lands which were determined to be favorable for the discovery of

Io' at 17.
ld.
S. 2726, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
S.31040, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
S. REP. No. 793, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980).
S. 902, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
S. 1637, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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oil or gas and which were within a "producing geologic province." 7 Lands outside a producing geologic province or lands
within any producing geologic province which were not favorable
for the discovery of oil or gas could be leased by the Secretary
without competitive bidding.'t ' In addition, the bill allowed the
Secretary to lease lands noncompetitively prior to identification
of all lands within a producing geologic province which were
favorable for discovery of oil or gas. Under S. 1637, the definition
of "lands favorable for discovery of oil or gas" included lands
within three miles of a known geological structure.109
At hearings held on S. 1637,110 Senator John Melcher (D.
Montana) criticized the bill as establishing more discretion in the
Secretary of the Interior and raising more doubt with respect to
the onshore oil and gas leasing program. S. 1637 was considered
by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and
was reported favorably with an amendment in the nature of a
substitute."' The bill, as amended by the Committee, would have
allowed leasing only on a competitive basis. Competitive bidding
was to occur on the basis of those bidding systems set forth in
Section 8(a)(1) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 1 12 and
was to be based upon the bidding systems which the Secretary
determined would maximize competition. No further action was
3
taken on the bill during the Ninety-sixth Congress."

'0 Congress adopted the "favorable petroleum geological province" standard to apply
to oil and gas leasing in Alaska when it enacted the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act in 1980, 16 U.S.C. § 3148 (1980).
0 S. 1637, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1979).
,o Id. at 3-4.
110Hearing on S. 1637 Before the Subcomm. on Energy Resources and Material
Production of the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1979) (statement of Senator John Melcher).
- S. REP. No. 793, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
1,2 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 8(a)(1), 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (1986).
, Additional legislation relating to the federal onshore oil and gas leasing program
was introduced in the 96th Congress. S. 2425 was introduced by Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R.
Wyoming) on March 14, 1980. S. 2425, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The bill would have
amended the MLA to direct the Secretary of the Interior to lease federal lands not within
any KGS, unless the Secretary determined that it was not in the national interest to lease
any such lands and the Congress approved the Secretary's determination. The bill was
considered by the Energy and Natural Resources Committee on April 16, 1980, and no
further action was taken. Also in the 96th Congress, Sen. Mark Hatfield (R. Oregon)
introduced S. 2424, on March 14, 1980. S. 2424, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). This bill
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After the events at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, Senator Dale
Bumpers (D. Arkansas) became the main proponent of federal
onshore oil and gas leasing reform in the Senate. Senator Bumpers
pursued the approach which had been reported favorably by the
Senate Energy Committee in the Ninety-sixth Congress. In the
Ninety-seventh, Ninety-eighth and Ninety-ninth Congresses, he
introduced legislation which was essentially the same as that reported favorably in the Ninety-sixth Congress. 1 4 All of these bills
provided that:
(1) leasing was to be permitted by competitive bidding only;
(2) the Secretary was directed at least once each quarter to
invite public nominations of areas favorable for discovery of oil
or gas; and
(3) any area available and suitable for leasing must be leased
if it receives two or more nominations in any one quarter or
receives a single nomination in two successive quarters.
In the Ninety-seventh Congress, S. 60 was referred to the
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, was considered by the full Committee, but was rejected by a vote of eleven
to eight. Senator Bumpers then proceeded to raise this provision
on the floor of the Senate. The legislation was offered as an
amendment to S. 1867, a bill to amend and supplement the
acreage limitation and residency provision of the federal reclamation law." 5 The amendment was defeated by a vote of thirtynine to fifty-eight. Strong opposition to the amendment was
voiced by members from oil and gas producing states.
During the ninety-eighth Congress, Representative James
Weaver (D. Oregon) introduced companion legislation to S. 581
in the House of Representatives. That bill, H.R. 4989, had the

same basic provisions as S. 581 .116

would have amended the MLA to require competitive bidding in oil and gas lands set
apart for military and naval purposes and to expand leasing by competitive bid to all areas
within 2-1/2 miles of a KGS. Again, the bill was considered by the full committee but no
further action was taken.
", See S. 373, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 581, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S.
60, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
"1 128 CoNG. REc. 16,481 (1982).
M6 H.R. 4989, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
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The Ninety-ninth Congress

B.

1. S. 2439
In the second session 1 7 of the Ninety-ninth Congress, Senator
Bumpers adopted a new approach to leasing reform. On May 13,
1986, he introduced S. 2439.118 The legislation set forth a twotiered approach to federal onshore oil and gas leasing. Under the
bill, lands would initially be subject to a competitive bid test. The
9
bill specified a minimum bid of thirty-five dollars per acre."
Lands for which no bid was received or for which the minimum
bid was not received, would become available for leasing on a
noncompetitive basis for a period not to exceed one year.120 The
bill also limited assignment of small parcels and contained new
enforcement provisions to address the problem of fraud and abuse
in the program. The bill provided for a fixed royalty of twelve
and one-half percent in amount or value of production. 2 '
On June 30, 1986, the bill was reported favorably by the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. 22 The Committee
made several modifications to the bill, including lowering the
minimum acceptable bid from thirty-five dollars to twenty dollars
per acre. 2 The Committee reasoned that this would cause more
land to be leased competitively with less falling through to the
noncompetitive tier, since land receiving bids between twenty
dollars and thirty-five dollars per acrewould be leased competitively.
2.

H.R. 1960

In the House, Representative George Miller (D. California)
introduced H.R. 1960'2 in the first session of the Ninety-ninth

"I During the first session of the 99th Congress, Sen. Bumpers introduced legislation,
S. 373, which authorized competitive bidding only on the basis of the bidding systems set
forth in § 8(a)(1) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (1986).
"I S. 2439, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
19

Id. at 2.

'm

Id.

121 Id.
"z
'I

S. REP. No. 412, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
Id. at 8.
H.R. 1960, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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Congress, with the intent of ending "the Department of the
Interior's scandal-ridden noncompetitive onshore oil and gas leasing program."' 2 5 The bill, like its predecessors, would have au-

thorized competitive leasing using only sealed bids and based on
the bidding systems set forth in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act.
3.

H.R. 4741

During the second session of the Ninety-ninth Congress, Representative John Seiberling (D. Ohio) introduced, on May 1, 1986,
H.R. 4741.126 That bill authorized competitive leasing only and
required each bidder to pay a seventy-five dollar nonrefundable
filing fee. H.R. 4741 provided a procedure for the nomination of
acres to be leased. Under the bill, the Secretary had discretion
not to issue a lease if there was good cause to believe the highest
bid did not fairly represent the lease value. The bill provided for
royalties of at least sixteen and two-thirds percent in amount or
value of production, and rental of not less than two dollars per
acre for years one through five and not less than four dollars per
acre thereafter.
In addition, H.R. 4741 contained a requirement of at least a
ninety-day notice by the Secretary of the Interior to states and
other interested parties prior to offering lands for lease and
approving development. The bill provided that the Secretary of
the Interior (or for public domain forest system lands, the Secretary of Agriculture) regulate all surface disturbance and determine reclamation requirements. The appropriate Secretary was to
approve a plan of operations covering all surface-disturbing activities and was to require posting of sufficient bond prior to issuance
of a permit to drill. The bill required approval by the Secretary
of Agriculture prior to lease issuance on national forest lands.
H.R. 4741 would have required the completion of a land use
plan prior to lease issuance. The plan was to specify any protective
stipulations necessary for leasing. In addition, the Secretary of
the Interior would be required to determine the suitability of lands

''

131 CONG. REC. 7705 (1985).
H.R. 4741, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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for leasing. H.R. 4741 also contained provisions prohibiting leasing in certain wilderness study areas and contained provisions
relating to exploration for oil and gas.
House subcommittee hearings were held on this bill on July
15 and 17, 1986, during which industry objected strongly to the
environmental and land use planning provisions of the legislation. 27 In addition, industry representatives opposed the requirement of all-competitive leasing. No further action was taken on
the legislation.
4.

H.R. 4826

Two weeks after introduction of H.R. 4741, Representative
Morris Udall (D. Arizona), Chairman of the House Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, introduced H.R. 4826.18 That
bill provided for a two-tiered system of leasing, as did the Bumpers bill, S. 2439. All lands would initially be offered for competitive leasing with a twenty dollars per acre minimum bid. Lands
for which no bid was received or for which the highest bid was
less than twenty dollars per acre would be offered noncompetitively for a period not to exceed one year.
H.R. 4826 provided for royalties of not less than twelve and
one-half percent in amount or value of production. The bill
provided for rentals of not less than one dollar per acre in years
one through five and three dollars per acre for each year thereafter.
H.R. 4826 contained provisions relating to land use planning,
which required completion of a land use plan addressing oil and
gas leasing except that lands could continue to be leased in the
absence of such plans where the Secretary provided a report to
Congress containing certain specified information. H.R. 4826 also
addressed oil and gas exploration. The bill contained provisions
to combat fraud and abuse as contained in S. 2439, the Bumpers
bill.

27 Hearing on H.R. 1960, H.R. 4741 and H.R. 4826 Before the Subcomm. on Mining
and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Interiorand Insular Affairs, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1986).
,1 H.R. 4826, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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Subcommittee hearings were held on H.R. 4826 on July 15
and 17, 1986.129 Environmentalists, while generally supportive of
changes in the leasing mechanism, testified that any such changes
should be accompanied by environmental and land use planning
reforms. As with the Seiberling bill, industry voiced strong objections to the land use planning provisions. No further action was
taken on the bill.
5. Legislation Passes the Senate
Spurred on by the impending end of the Ninety-ninth Congress, widespread frustration with the onshore oil and gas leasing
program, and a feeling on the part of some industry-oriented
Senators that the One Hundredth Congress might be more sympathetic to the environmental and land use planning provisions
contained in the House bills, the full Senate passed a modified
version of S. 2439 twice in the waning days of the Congress.
Passage was preceded by a series of intense negotiations on outstanding issues of concern to industry, and in particular, to some
independent producers.
As a result of these discussions, the Committee-passed version
of S. 2439 was modified to provide: (1) lands would be available
in the noncompetitive tier for a period not to exceed three years,
as opposed to one year; (2) all lands available noncompetitively
on an over-the-counter basis would continue to be available on
that basis for a period not to exceed fifty months; (3) lease sales
would be conducted by oral bidding only and would be held at
least every two months; and (4) the Department of the Interior
would be required to take certain actions in administering the
program within time frames specified by the bill.
This modified version of S. 2439 passed the Senate twice as
an amendment to H.R. 4645, a bill introduced by Representative
Seiberling to modify the boundaries of the Cuyahoga Valley
National Recreation Area. 130 The amendment 131 was offered on

I" Hearing on H.R. 1960, H.R. 4741 and H.R. 4826 Before the Subcomm. on Mining
and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1986).
11 Amdt. No. SP 3489.
"I H.R. 4645, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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October 17, 1986, by Senator James McClure (R. Idaho), then
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and was adopted by the full Senate twice by voice vote.
Also included in the "package" of amendments to H.R. 4645
were provisions relating to National Park System fees and to the
American Conservation Corps. Representative Seiberling had long
supported the latter.
Despite the success in securing passage of the legislation by
the Senate, the House failed to consider or pass the legislation in
the Ninety-ninth Congress.
C.

The One Hundredth Congress

The close of the first session of the One Hundredth Congress
brought with it enactment of comprehensive legislation to reform
the federal onshore oil and gas leasing program. This legislation
built upon and modified several of the legislative concepts developed and considered in previous Congresses. The final product
was the result of many compromises on the part of divergent
interests.
Recurrent themes emerged as the One Hundredth Congress
considered the legislation. Prominent among these was the continuing "widespread frustration in the oil patch" over BLM's
administration of the program. 3 2 Independent producers testified
that BLM was drawing KGS's to encompass "unjustifiably large
areas, thereby backing [independents] ... into a de facto allcompetitive system."' 33 According to many independents, there
had been a "distortion of the KGS concept to cover entire basins,
without geologic basis."'' Further, they alleged that the DOI had
reacted to criticism of the KGS process through "interminable
delay" in making KGS determinations and that the DOI had
failed to issue leases while KGS status was reconsidered.'
1388 Before the Subcomm. on Mineral Resources
132 Hearing on S. 66 and S.
Development and Production of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1987) (statement of David Schaenen, representing the Independent Petroleum Association of America and the Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association) [hereinafter Hearings].
,3 Id. at 124.
33 Id. at 113. (statement of Kenneth A. Wonstolen, Executive Director and General
Counsel, Independent Petroleum Assoc. of Mountain States).
"3 Id. at 112.
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A resounding endorsement of a more market-oriented leasing
system was provided by the DOI which noted the failings of the
KGS system and the impossibility of providing an administrative
remedy: "[KGS] determinations will always be questioned no
matter how qualified our personnel are or the size of the budget
dedicated to making those determinations. We know of no better
way of identifying which lands are of sufficient value to generate
competition than going to the market place.'

' 36

The DOI also

noted that a two-tiered market-oriented approach would bring
"stability and predictability to the Federal onshore oil and gas
37

leasing program." 1

Tempering the theme of frustration over the KGS system and
the momentum for reform was the recognition of economic distress in the oil patch. For example, the DOI urged that changes
to the MLA be considered in the context of the depressed state
of the oil industry and the existing threat to energy security. 135
Concern over the economic state of the oil and gas industry
manifested itself in the debate over the level of the minimum bid.
Those favoring a high minimum bid included independents whose
livelihood depended on participation in the SIMO lottery. In their
view a high minimum bid would ensure continued existence of
the lottery and a greater possibility that the independents could
obtain the desired leases without being out-bid by major producers. 19 In addition, concern over the economic health of the
industry was evident in efforts by many independents to secure
an exemption from any new leasing system for lands then available for leasing on an over-the-counter basis. Independents argued
that this was important in order to preserve continued industry
access to frontier exploration prospects. 140
Finally, many independents sought to have a relatively longer
period for lease availability in the noncompetitive tier of the
system. Again, independents felt that increased availability on a

"1 Id. at 51. (statement of Robert F. Burford, Director, Bureau of Land Management,
U.S. Department of the Interior).
137
Id.

138

Hearings, supra note 132, at 48-49.

Id. at 128-29 (statement of David Schaenen, representing the Independent Petroleum Association of America and the Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association).
1, Id. at 113 (statement of Kenneth A. Wonstolen, Executive Director and General
Counsel, Independent Petroleum Association of Mountain States).
"I
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noncompetitive basis would enhance their ability to obtain desired

leases. 141
An ever-present theme in the One Hundredth Congress was
concern over the budget and the federal deficit. The reform of
the federal onshore oil and gas leasing system was estimated to
result in budget savings by the Budget Committees and the Congressional Budget Office. The reform legislation was, therefore,
an appropriate component of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987. By law,142 this bill received expedited consideration
and was subject to streamlined parliamentary procedures. In addition, market-oriented, competitive bidding apparently had appeal, which a noncompetitive lottery drawing of leases lacked, to
many budget-conscious members of Congress.
Finally, there were persistent and earnestly-felt arguments by
environmentalists that environmental and land-use planning requirements in the federal onshore oil and gas leasing program
were inadequate, and that reform in those areas was an essential
component of any new legislation. 143 These arguments were met
with uniform opposition by industry.1 4
Against this thematic backdrop, the Congress considered five
federal onshore oil and gas leasing bills during the first session
of the One Hundredth Congress, and ultimately enacted the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Act of 1987.
1.

S. 66

For the fifth consecutive Congress, Senator Bumpers introduced legislation to reform the federal onshore oil and gas leasing
program. S. 66 provided for a two-tiered leasing system, as approved by the Senate during the Ninety-ninth Congress. 45 The
"I Id. at 114.
,41See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§
190a-1 note, 190a-3, 190b, 190d, 601-603, 621-623, 631-642, 651-653, 661, 681-688 (1974).
141Hearing on S. 66 and 1388 Before the Subcomm. on Mineral Resources Development and Production of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., 139. (Statement of Karl Gawell, National Wildlife Federation).
I" d. at 114-15. (Statement of Kenneth A. Wonstolen, Executive Director and
General Council, Independent Petroleum Association of Mountain States); Id. at 190.
(Statement of the American Petroleum Institute).
"I S. 66, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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bill provided for a minimum bid of twenty dollars per acre, with
Secretarial discretion to raise the minimum bid. The period of
availability for noncompetitive leasing, or recycle period, was not
to exceed one year, with Secretarial discretion to set the period
at one year or less. The bill retained existing law on lease terms
and rentals. S. 66 provided for a fixed royalty of twelve and onehalf percent in amount or value of production. The bill prohibited
assignments of less than 640 acres in most circumstances and
contained extensive anti-fraud provisions. The DOI testified in
support of S. 66 and provided favorable executive comment on
the bill.'1
2.

S. 1388

On June 18, 1987, Senator John Melcher introduced legislation, S. 1388, to provide for a two-tiered oil and gas leasing
system. Under that bill, the minimum bid was fixed at one dollar
per acre. After lands were offered for competitive bid, all lands
becoming available for leasing on a noncompetitive basis would
continue to be so available until leased. All lands available on an
over-the-counter basis on the date of enactment would continue
to be available on that basis until leased. Rental was set at one
dollar per acre and all leases were to have a ten-year primary
term. Royalties were to be fixed at twelve and one-half percent
in amount or value of production. S. 1388 contained the same
assignment and anti-fraud provisions as S. 66. The DOI expressed
concern over various provisions of the bill.' 41
3.

S. 1730

The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
considered onshore oil and gas leasing reform legislation on July
29, 1987 and September 23, 1987. As a result, S. 1730 was
reported favorably by the Committee on September 30, 1987, as
an original measure in lieu of S. 66 and S. 1388.14 The legislation

I" Hearing on S. 66 and S. 1388 Before the Subcomm. on Mineral Resources
Development and Production of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 44, 51 (1987); S. REP. No. 188, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1987).
S. 1388, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
10 S. REP. No. 188, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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was also reported to the Senate Committee on the Budget as part
of the response of the Senate Committee on Energy49 and Natural
Resources to its budget reconciliation instructions.1
Like S. 66 and S. 1388, S. 1730 provided for a two-tiered
system of leasing. As a result of compromise, the minimum bid
was set at a level of at least ten dollars per acre. The bill provided
for a period of availability for noncompetitive leasing not to
exceed three years. Under the bill, all lands available for leasing
on an over-the-counter basis were to remain so available for a
period of twenty-four months from the date of issuance of final
program regulations.
The bill set rentals at not less than one dollar per acre and
royalties at twelve and one-half percent in amount or value of
production. The bill contained provisions authorizing the Secretary to prohibit most assignments of less than 640 acres and
contained anti-fraud provisions. The bill contained no land use
planning or environmental provisions.
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that S. 1730, as
reported by Committee, would result in savings of $10 million in
fiscal year 1988, and $20 million per year during fiscal years 1989
through 1992.150
4.

H.R. 933

During the first session of the One Hundredth Congress,
Representative George Miller introduced H.R. 933, which authorized competitive leasing only.' The bill provided for a leasing
mechanism essentially identical to bills offered in previous Congresses, and authorized a competitive leasing system based on
bidding systems provided for in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act.

52
1

The bill set rents at not less than two dollars per acre per
year in the first through fifth years of a lease and not less than
four dollars per acre per year thereafter. H.R. 933 set royalties

1,9Budget reconciliation instructions were contained in H. Con. Res. 43 (the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1988).
S. REP. No. 188, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1987).
H.R. 933, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
152 Id.
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at a fixed sixteen and two-thirds percent of value or production.
The bill would have required the Secretary to notify affected
states and interested parties ninety days before offering lands for
lease and at least ninety days before approving development activities. The bill required regulation of surface-disturbing activities
and the establishing of standards for bonding. H.R. 933 provided
that the Secretary of the Interior may not issue any lease on
national forest lands without the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture. In addition, H.R. 933 contained provisions of environmental requirements and land use planning, as introduced in
prior Congresses.
5. H.R. 2851
Congressman Nick Rahall (D. West Virginia) introduced H.R.
2851 on June 30, 1987.13 The bill was amended and reported
favorably by the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on
September 23, 1987.114 The legislation was also included as part
of the Committee's budget reconciliation legislation.
H.R. 2851, as reported by the Committee, also provided for
a two-tiered approach to oil and gas leasing. The bill required
that all tracts initially be offered competitively, with no minimum
bid. A nonrefundable bidding fee of seventy-five dollars would
have been required. Tracts that received no bid were to be made
available for a period not to exceed one year on a noncompetitive
basis.
Under the legislation, rent would be set at not less than two
dollars per acre per year in the first through fifth year of the
lease and not less than three dollars per acre per year thereafter.
Royalties were set at not less than twelve and one-half percent of
value of production for competitive and noncompetitive leases.
H.R. 2851 provided that notice must be given at least sixty
days before offering lands for lease and at least thirty days before
substantially modifying the terms of any oil or gas lease. Periodic
notice of pending applications for permits to drill was to be given
by the Secretary.

H.R. 2851, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
H.R. REp. No. 378, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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The bill provided for the regulation of surface-disturbing activities, required the approval of a plan of operations, and required that bonding standards be established. In addition, the bill
provided that no oil or gas lease could be issued to any person
who had failed to comply with reclamation requirements until
that person complied with such requirements.
H.R. 2851 provided that the Secretary of the Interior may
not issue any lease on public domain national forest lands without
the consent of the Secretary of Agriculture. The bill contained a
section requiring that land use plans be amended to include an
analysis of oil and gas potential, the economic and environmental
consequences of development, and identification of protective
stipulations to be applied in developing the area. After a specified
date, no oil and gas leases could be issued until planning requirements were met. The bill would have prohibited oil and gas leasing
on certain wilderness study lands. Finally, the bill contained provisions to combat fraudulent practices.
H.R. 2851, as reported by Committee, was estimated by the
Congressional Budget Office to result in savings of $10 million in
fiscal year 1988, $12 million in fiscal years 1989 and 1990, and
$26 million in fiscal years 1991 and 1992.155
6.

Conference on the Legislation

As the session progressed, it became likely that the federal
onshore oil and gas leasing reform legislation would be a part of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987. Both the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs had included the legislation in their budget reconciliation packages, and such legislation was subsequently passed by both houses of Congress. In
addition, the Congressional Budget Office had scored both bills
as achieving budget savings. As part of its work on the budget
reconciliation bill, both houses of Congress designated conferees
to serve on the "mini-conferences" relating to different components of the legislation. Key participants in the conference on the
leasing reform component of the bill were: Representatives Rahall,

"

H.R. REP. No. 378, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1987).
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Miller, and Udall; and Senators Bumpers, Melcher, and Wallop.
Given the differing versions of the legislation, the conferees
had several issues to resolve, including:
1. the minimum bid;
2. period of availability for noncompetitive leasing ("recycle
period");
3. phase-in for over-the-counter lands;
4.

land use planning;

5. notice and reclamation;
6.

Secretary of Agriculture consent to leasing;

7. designation of lands not subject to leasing; and
8. lease issuance prohibition due to non-reclamation.
The conferees met over a period of three days, and in a classic
example of legislative compromise, agreed to a version of reform
legislation, which became the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987.
V.

THE FEDERAL ONSHORE OIL AND GAS LEASING REFORM ACT
OF 1987

The Leasing Mechanism

A.

The Reform Act provides for a two-tiered system of leasing.
All lands to be leased are to be made available initially on a
competitive bid basis. Lands not receiving the minimum bid then
become available on a noncompetitive basis for a fixed period,
at the end of which the lands are "recycled" and again put to a
competitive test.
1.

Minimum Bid

The Reform Act sets the national minimum acceptable bid at
two dollars per acre for a period of two years after the date of
enactment. 15 6 Thereafter, the Secretary may establish by regulation

"'

The Reform Act § 5102(a), to be codified at 30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(I)(B) (1988).
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a national minimum acceptable bid higher than two dollars per
acre based upon certain findings related to enhancing financial
returns to the United States and promoting efficient management
of the resource.

15 7

Reaching a compromise on the issue of minimum bid was key
to securing passage of the legislation. The House bill provided
for a minimum bid fixed at two dollars per acre, while the Senate
version authorized the Secretary to establish a national minimum
acceptable price which was to be at least ten dollars per acre. As
a compromise, the Reform Act combined aspects of both the
158

Senate and House approaches.

2.

Period of Availability for Noncompetitive Leasing ("Recycle
Period")

Under the Reform Act, lands not receiving the minimum bid
would become available on a noncompetitive basis for a period
of two years after the competitive sale.159 The House bill provided
for a one year recycle period, while the Senate version provided
for a three year recycle period.' 60
3.

Phase-in for Over-the-Counter Lands

The Reform Act provides no phase-in 61 for over-the-counter
lands. The House bill was silent on this issue. However, the Senate
version had provided that OTC lands would remain available on
that basis for twenty-four months. As part of the overall compromise, the Senate receded to the House on this issue.'
4.

Other Leasing Provisions

The Reform Act provides that competitive sales are to be by
oral bidding only. 63 It imposes a seventy-five dollar application

Id.
H.R. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 778 (1987).
The Reform Act, § 5102(a), to be codified at 30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(I)(A) (1988).
H.R. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 781 (1987).
provision would have allowed the continued availability of OTC
161 A "phase-in"
lands on an over-the-counter basis for a fixed period of time prior to being subject to a
competitive lease sale under the new system.
lu H.R. REp. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 780 (1987).
161 The Reform Act, § 5102(a), to be codified at 30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1)(A) (1988).
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fee for leases issued without competitive bidding, m6retains existing
law with respect to the royalty rate, 65 and prospectively sets rent
at not less than one dollar and fifty cents per acre for the first
five years of a lease and not less than two dollars per acre
thereafter.166 Lease sales are to be held not less frequently than
67
quarterly. 1
B.

Land Use Planning and Environmental Provisions
1. Land Use Planning

Another key to securing passage of the Reform Act was
compromise on the land use planning provisions. The Senate
version contained no such provisions, while the House bill did.
Several Senate conferees expressed a strongly held view that the
Reform Act was not an appropriate vehicle for land use planning
reform. As a result, the compromise deleted the House provisions
and provided for a study of the manner in which oil and gas
resources are considered in land use plans. 16
2.

Notice and Reclamation

The Reform Act requires the Secretary of the Interior to post
notice in the appropriate local office of the leasing and land
management agency at least forty-five days before offering lands
for lease and at least thirty days before approving applications
for permits to drill or substantially modifying the terms of any
lease. 69 This provision is similar to that contained in the House
bill. The Senate bill contained no notice provision. 170 The Reform
Act also requires regulation of all surface disturbing activities
conducted pursuant to leasing. This includes Secretarial approval
of surface disturbing activities. It also requires that adequate

Id., at § 5102(b), 30 U.S.C. § 226(c)(1) (1988).
, Id., at § 5102(a), (b), 30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1)(A), (c)(1) (1988).
1 Id., at § 5102(c), 30 U.S.C. § 226(d) (1988).
'6,

I6
Id., at § 5102(a), 30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1)(A) (1988).

H.R. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 779 (1987).
The Reform Act, § 5102(d), to be codified at 30 U.S.C. § 226(0 (1988).
,70 H.R. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 779 (1987).
'
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reclamation be ensured.' 7' The Senate receded to the House on
12
this issue.

3. Secretary of Agriculture Consent to Leasing
Pursuant to the Reform Act, no oil and gas lease can be
issued on National Forest Lands over the objection of the Secretary of Agriculture. 73 The House version required consent by
the Secretary of Agriculture, while the Senate bill required only
that the Secretary of Agriculture be consulted prior to leasing. 174
4.

Lands Not Subject to Leasing

Under the Reform Act, the Secretary of the Interior may not
issue oil and gas leases on certain specified federal lands, including
those recommended for wilderness allocation by the surface managing agency, those within BLM wilderness study areas, those
designated by Congress as wilderness study areas (with certain
exceptions), and certain lands allocated for wilderness and further
planning. 75 The Senate version contained no such provision. Once
again, as part of the overall compromise, the Senate receded to
the House on this matter.

5.

76

Lease Issuance Prohibition Due to Non-Reclamation

The Reform Act also contains a provision prohibiting onshore
oil and gas lease issuance to any entity that fails to reclaim a
lease, or is controlled by or under common control with an entity
failing to reclaim an oil and gas lease, until such time as reclamation requirements are met. 77 This provision blends the House
178
and Senate versions.

m The Reform Act, § 5102(d), to be codified
H.R. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
The Reform Act, § 5102(d), to be codified
174H.R. REP. No. 495,100th Cong., 1st Sess.
"I The Reform Act, § 5112, to be codified at
H.R. REp. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
'" The Reform Act, § 5102(d), to be codified
" H.R. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.

at 30 U.S.C. § 226(g) (1988).
779 (1987).
at 30 U.S.C. § 226(h) (1988).
779 (1987).
30 U.S.C. § 226-3 (1988).
781-782 (1987).
at 30 U.S.C. § 226(g) (1988).
782 (1987).
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C. Anti-fraud Provisions
The Reform Act adds new, broad authority to combat fraud
and other infractions under the MLA. 79 Pursuant to these provisions, it is unlawful for any person to organize or participate
in a scheme or plan to circumvent or defeat the provisions of the
MLA or its implementing regulations.1' ° In addition, the Reform
Act makes it unlawful to seek to obtain, or to obtain, money or
property by means of false statements concerning the value of a
lease, the availability of land for leasing, the ability of any person
to obtain a lease, or the provisions of the MLA or its implementing regulations.
The provision imposes criminal penalties of up to $500,000,
imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, and civil
penalties of not more than $100,000 per violation or other appropriate remedy. Also, the section allows states to bring civil actions
against any person conducting activity within the state in violation
8
of the section.' '
Both House and Senate bills contained similar anti-fraud provisions. In addition, the Reform Act allows the Secretary to
disapprove the assignment of areas under lease of less than 640
82
acres outside Alaska or of less than 2560 acres within Alaska.
CONCLUSION

After several years of intensive effort by Members of Congress, executive branch officials, industry representatives and environmentalists, reform of the federal onshore oil and gas leasing
program has finally become a reality. Test sales held under the
new law give reason for optimism. As a result of the first eight
sales, some 1.1 million acres were leased, with receipts to the
government of approximately $24.8 million. The average bid on
the lease parcels ranged from $4.20 per acre to $37.32 per acre.
In the course of debate on the legislation, Senator Dale Bumpers observed, "There is only one person who knows what a known

"

"'

The
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
I82

Reform Act, § 5108, to be codified at 30 U.S.C. § 195 (1988).
30 U.S.C. § 195(a) (1988).
30 U.S.C. § 195(b), (f) (1988).
at § 5103, 30 U.S.C. § 187a (1988),
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geological structure is, and that's God."' 3 While a definitive
assessment of the workability of the new legislation is premature,
Congress has at least done away with the known geological structure concept and, hopefully, moved from a system where, as
Senator Bumpers noted, divine insight was necessary for successful
administration to a system that can be administered by mere
mortals.

"IOversight Hearing on Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Program Before the
Subcomm. on Mining and NaturalResources of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1985) (statement of Senator Dale Bumpers, Arkansas).

